312 133 A unique irrigation device was introduced into the oasis of Komul by the Chinese administrator Chang Yao in the nineteenth century. Because of the exceptionally porous sandy soil in this oasis, he had water carried for miles across the desert in wooden troughs lined with felt. This device is too expensive for present costs.

Although agriculture in northern Sinkiang is also irrigated, cultivation is not so sharply isolated in oases as it is in the south. The main water supply for irrigation comes from the Ili, Manass, and Black Irtish rivers.

Of these the Ili is formed by the confluence of three rivers, the Kash, the Kunges, and the Tekes. The volume discharged by these three rivers at high water is 100 cubic meters per second for the Kash and Tekes and 30 cubic meters per second for the Kunges.

133 731 The Manass is a slow river, but when in flood it is troublesome. It cuts extra flood channels which discharge into marshes just below the Manass oasis, and consequently its terminal lake, Telli Nor, farther out in the plain, is steadily drying up.

The headwaters of the Irtish are in the Altai, where the snow level is much lower than in the Tien Shan. The spring flood therefore comes down six weeks earlier on the Irtish than it does on the Manass, which is beneficial for spring planting.

312 631 423 Wherever irrigation is practiced, water rights are even more fundamental than land ownership. In Sinkiang, there are two bodies of custom and practice with regard to water. One is associated with the *kariz*. The other prevails much more widely, has a complicated history, and a number of variants.

The rights, obligations, and customs associated with the simple practice of leading water in ditches from rivers undoubtedly go back to the ancient form of communal enterprise in which all the members of the community contributed their labor, and the water was shared out not to individuals with proprietary rights in particular fields, but to kinship groups cultivating fields to which they had a collective title.

In a community which is still lacking in large-scale private

money capital, however, it is not surprising that the line at which work actually starts is still determined by the necessity for public labor, which must be assembled and directed by the exercise of public authority in some form. A typical recent example is the digging of an irrigation canal in the small oasis of Chira. As six villages were affected, three hundred men were assembled from these villages under the authority of their own village headmen. The village organization, however, can be superseded by the higher administrative authority of Chinese officials. The general rule is: local undertakings on a moderate scale are carried out within the limits of such co-operation as can be organized by village elders or headmen; enterprise on a large scale requires the intervention of a Chinese official.

At levels below the intervention of Chinese officials, traces of very ancient practices are found. Field investigation in a village in the oasis of Kucha revealed the survival of the "*ketman* of labor," a concept which combines units of labor, land, and water. The *ketman* is a broad-bladed mattock, the most ancient Inner Asian agricultural tool, which to this day is more widely used than the plow. A "*ketman* of labor" is the work of one man contributed throughout the digging of a canal, which entitles him to a "*ketman* of water," enough to irrigate from ten to fourteen acres.

In this village, however, the uniformity of the concept proved not to be reflected in uniformity of water rights. Of the total population about 8 per cent were landlords and rich peasants; but this 8 per cent owned about half of the total water supply. At the other end of the scale 17 per cent of the population had no water rights whatever, and were forced to purchase their water with a share of their crop. In between these two groups, one half of the water was owned by 75 per cent of the households. These families, classified as middle and poor peasants, had rights to an average of one third of a *ketman* of water for each household.

The shuffle which takes place between the contribution of labor and the allocation of water rights is accounted for in various ways. According to the Islamic principle of *mavat*, he who first

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

423 241 applies water to land has the right to both water and land; but by a legal reasoning which is not difficult to follow, the ancient prescriptive communal right of the man whose labor helps to bring the water to the field can be superseded by the claim of the man who organized the labor and directed the enterprise.

578 423 241 Thus in 1940, in the large oasis of Aksu, the Chinese district magistrate ordered the digging of a canal to open a new settlement at Sachintze, about forty miles south of the district city. Each head of a household applying for land in the new settlement was allotted a section of about one hundred feet on the bank of the main canal. He was then entitled to as much land reaching back from this canal frontage as he could clear and as much water as he needed to irrigate it. Land and water rights were thus combined, and were in proportion to the amount of labor at the disposal of the setder. It is not surprising to find both that quarrels over water rights are chronic, and that those who are powerful and successful within the community in other ways are usually successful also in maintaining and increasing their water rights.

566 312 423 More than a hundred years ago, at a time when the Chinese or Manchu imperial authority in Sinkiang was exercised only in questions of high policy and rarely interfered with questions of local custom, a Chinese writer recorded the abuses of the Begs or local notables, and the efforts made by the Chinese administration to "persuade" them to concede some of their water rights to poor peasants. In the eighteenth century, a Manchu writer noted that Begs or landed gentry had rights over households of *chakar* or serfs who were obliged to till their land for them.[13] By their claim on the labor of these serfs, the Begs under the doctrine of *mavat* also claimed the right to water from canals dug by the serfs.[14] *Chakar* serfdom still survives here and there. Field investigation revealed a landlord in Kucha with over two hundred

[13] Sung Yin, *A Sketch of Sinkiang*, written in the eighteenth century, published in 1821; Ch. 3, p. 28 (in Chinese).

[14] E. Zalkhina, *Outlines of the Agrarian Problem in Central Asia*, p. 9 (in Russian).

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households of *chakars*, from whom he claimed both labor services and rent in kind.

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When the water finally gets to the field, its allocation to the cultivator is calculated in terms of the flow for a certain number of hours, according to the width and depth of the canal. Millers have the right only to run water over the wheel, and must then return it to the canal. Such matters, together with the maintenance of registers and the supervision of upkeep, are under the authority of an official called the *mirab*, who is locally elected, which means that in his election the locally influential families usually determine the choice. In addition, Moslem religious officials have certain traditional rights, especially of adjudication. Within localities, disputes are most frequent in the spring, when each cultivator is eager to be the first to get water on his land. Between localities, the most important disputes are between upstream and downstream communities. Disputes have been going on for twenty-five years between Yarkand, which is big and powerful, and Merket, which is smaller but rich in the cultivation of cotton. Quarrels can be carried from lower to higher authority. A dispute between the villages of Punak and Malihalihan, in the subdistrict of Chira, was carried up to the district administrator of Khotan, who decreed that for two days each month in February, April, and June Punak should turn over its flow of water to Malihalihan. The intervention of higher authority is a traditional opportunity for the collection of bribes by Chinese officials.

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Oases vary greatly in size but closely resemble each other in structure. Every oasis has a village or town, sometimes a walled city at its center. Larger oases may have several such towns. These centers are called "bazaars" and serve as market places for farm produce. In the larger bazaars there are also artisans such as blacksmiths, carpenters, coppersmiths, cobblers, and wheelwrights. Smaller bazaars, which cannot support many permanent shops, have their market day on different days of the week and the merchants and artisans visit them in rotation.

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Around the bazaars are the farms, each with its own homestead. An important function of an oasis bazaar is the distribution

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

India. The silkworms are fed on leaves from mulberry trees grown along the roadsides; there are also a few groves of wild mulberry. In recent years the Russians attempted to improve quality by importing eggs of the Baghdad, Oro, and Ascoli varieties. Silk production reached 350,000 kg. in 1942, but fell drastically to 100,000 kg. in 1943.

The basic producing unit in oasis agriculture is the family group living together under one roof. This group often includes married children, which makes it slightly larger than the average farm family in China. In Central China (Wukiang) an average farm family consists of four persons,[18] in North China (Paoting) of six persons,[19] in Northwest China (Kansu) of 6.87 persons.[20] A field survey in Khotan showed 7.95 persons, and in Kashgar a typical family consisted of an old couple, two sons, and three daughters-in-law. In the tiny oasis of Kumish a similar family consisted of parents, three sons, two daughters-in-law, and a daughter and her husband, or nine in all.

While farms in the Tarim Basin average from 4½ to 6 acres in size, larger than the 4.2 acres given for China proper,[21] the larger size of the families means, in Khotan for instance, only .58 acres per capita as against .68 acres in China proper.

There are many farms, of course, which are much smaller than the overall average. The field survey referred to above, covering sixty-five households in two villages in the Khotan oasis, showed that the smallest farm was 1.08 acres and the largest farm was 18 acres. A further breakdown of the figures shows that rich peasants in this group of sixty-five households had average holdings of 11.1 acres, middle peasants 5.7 acres, and poor peasants 2.8 acres.[22] The farms of the poor peasants are too small for the

[18] Fei Hsiao-tung, *Peasant Life in China*, New York, 1939, p. 29.

[19] Farm survey conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences, Academia Sinica.

[20] Farm survey conducted by the National Resources Commission of China.

[21] Geo. B. Cressey, *Asia, Lands and Peoples*, New York, 1944, p. 84.

[22] Uighur farmers, however, do not measure their land by its size but in terms of the amount of seed which can be sown on it. The Uighur measure for this purpose is the *charak*, which varies both from place to place and according to the seed measured. In Kashgar, the *charak* equals 24 pounds of

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

423 efficient use of draft animals, and it is a problem how to employ efficiently, on a tiny farm, the labor potential of the large Uighur family.

Trade and Finance

439 487 Today as throughout the past the biggest share of Sinkiang's trade is with territories to the west rather than with China, which lies to the east. In trade with Sinkiang the Soviet Union has inherited an advantage created by geography. The richest parts of Sinkiang lie along the western frontier, and goods from these districts can reach the Soviet Union by relatively easy trade routes. It will be difficult to change the circuit of trade even by building rail and road communications with China, because these new trade routes would have to cross many hundred miles of barren land in which there are no markets and no pay loads to be picked up.

438 174 Both farming and herding contribute to the trade of Sinkiang. Theoretically, both oasis farmers and steppe or alpine herdsmen can live without trade. Each way of life is capable, at a pinch, of providing everything that is needed to sustain the community. Historically, however, no long-continued period of "pinch" of this kind can be identified. There are proofs of trade from the Neolithic Age onward. In practice, only farmers and herdsmen who are so poor that they have no surplus whatever to sell are "pure" farmers and herdsmen. When the Chinese first came to Sinkiang in the Han Dynasty, the annals record that they found trade between oases: the little "kingdoms" of Shan-shan (near Lob Nor), Pu-li, and I-nai drew grain from the larger oases of Charchen, Yarkand, and Kashgar. Since oases like Charklik and Turfan frequently fell under the rule of the nomad Hsiungnu, there must

wheat, 25 of barley, or 28 of corn. The field survey just quoted showed that the average size of farm cultivated by one household was 25.8 *charaks*, the largest 100 *charaks*, and the smallest six. Measurement on the spot indicated that one *charak* of seed would sow about .18 acres, so that the average size of farm in these villages worked out at four and a half acres.

563 621 593 562 /Oirats/ return to her father's family, in which case she forfeits all rights which were hers as a member of her husband's family.

The oldest male of the oldest family holds the position of 563 622 "axalaci" which carries with it the right of final authority in the group. Upon the death of the "axalaci" authority over the "xotn" is invested in his wife who in turn passes the care of the herds on to her oldest son or a younger brother of her husband.

[422] [233] Herds are the common property of the "xotn" but are managed by the "axalaci." However, the cattle belonging to dependent related or non-related families are managed by the owners and is not the common property of the "xotn."

563 622 591 233 If any of the sons of the "axalaci" desires to move away from the family and establish himself independently, he can rightfully claim a percentage of the common herd. If the particular times happen to be especially prosperous so that cattle are in such abundance that pasturage in one area is lacking to supply them all, the son might be encouraged to leave, the pressure for his departure increasing if there were ample manpower to get along without him.

563 629 233 428 When the "axalaci" dies the herds are distributed evenly among his children, with the exception of the eldest son, who receives a larger percentage than his younger brothers. A certain percentage also passes into the ownership of the clergy.

563 621 The "xotn" or encampment is a political as well as an economic unit. It is termed a "fifteen" (does this mean that each "xotn" was broken into units of fifteen yurts, or is it simply a convenient term synonomous with "xotn"? The reference is vague on this point.)

563 628 [626] If a crime is committed by a member of a particular "fifteen" against an individual or group outside of his own "fifteen" the entire unit will be penalized for this infraction of the law. Thus, a strong element of social control was made operative.

563 62 [65] [582] The "xotn" is also a very convenient unit for purposes of taxation, and as a resource of cattle and other animals it was the income for the nobility and the lamaseries. In addition the encampment is an exogamic unit.

563 628 233 423 The use of pasturage among the various "xotan" is based primarily on tradition. Each has several hundred acres of land from which they choose a part each summer and each winter. If by chance one group needs the pasturage of another, the former will ask permission, and this will normally be granted. Special arrangements have always to be made, however; no group can simply move in on another's pasturage.

563 622 628 The axalaci of several "fifteens" in addition to chosen

of the average Chinese seems to be fatalistic, considering Providence or Heaven to determine his fortune in life. In general, the average Chinese is rather indifferent in religious matters, although he might be sensitive if someone looked askance on his belief in local spirits, demons, and gods, but this is merely a matter of tradition rather than religion.

The Chinese is strongly individualistic and usually dislikes to be ordered around and governed; he ardently defends his own opinions. His inclination for social groupings is obvious. Wherever Chinese live, they soon form integrated communities and at times of distress or in critical situations they are ready to help each other collectively, a characteristic tendency found especially within the extended family, which as a rule feels itself responsible as a whole for debts, misdeeds, etc., of any member. The Chinese are reported to be basically anti-militaristic, although this may be more a traditional attitude of the literati than a sound fact, considering only the last fifty years of Chinese history. However, a Chinese proverb says, "From good iron do not make nails; from good men do not make soldiers." To toil his fields in peace, to make a living this way, and to raise his children, whom he deeply loves, and not to be interfered with by state and government, can be described as the average conception of the "good life." The average Chinese of the Northwest lives in simple mud or stone houses (in the Yellow River area, caves of the adjacent loess hills), stove, k'ang, and ancestor altar being almost the only furniture.

Culture, art, and literature were primarily fostered by the richer merchants, land and water owners, and, or course, the officials and scholars. These groups represented, up to 1949, an economically powerful class who owned a considerable part of the land and the water rights. Chinese officials of the frontier provinces had a reputation for being extremely money-minded. The Chinese gentry, consisting of former officials and degree holders, who were in many cases at the same time holders of land or watter rights, have been abolished as a class, while large parts of the academic strata, the intelligentsia, became more or less the Communist avantgarde of China, showing the same phenomenon which appeared in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc., before and during the Second World War, where the intelligentsia showed a deep inclination towards Communism.

In regard to the nomadic minorities of the Northwest (Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Mongols and Tibetans) the dominant social motives are two fold, and can be subdivided into an economic and a religious one, equally strong. The whole economic life of the nomads is centered around their livestock. The nomad's life

V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century. Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirghiz, Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

614 563 common migrations, and military alliance, was forced to unite into a large grouping. Clan solidarity is extremely strong. Even after the old tribal constitution was abolished in Soviet Russia, workers of the same kholkhoz felt they belonged to a new clan and observed clan exogamy, which, in this case of course, had no genetic basis.

The oldest clans emerged many centuries ago and were named after totem-animals, or after famous tribal leaders (e.g., Özbeg Khan after whom the Uzbeks are named). Some of the Kirghiz clan names of totemistic origin are bugu "stag", sary bagish "yellow elk", chong bagish "great elek", etc. Among Turkomans one finds many clan names of totemistic origin, e.g., ak okuz "white ox", qara okuz "black ox", ailar "bear", burgut "hawk", due "camel", kulan "wild donkey". The aul, great-aul and clan are all connected by [602] [621] blood relationships real or imagined. The feeling of kinship is highly developed, and manifests itself in mutual assistance in military activities and in cases of cattle losses due to theft, disease, or lack of precipitation.

The clan assumes joint responsibilities for the welfare of the whole group, in general, and for the deeds committed by individual members of the clan. [672] The clan also takes collective action [681] in cases of theft or murder suffered by any clan members. Grazing land is never individual property but belongs to the aul, great- [423] aul or clan. Bäks and khans form the nobility which is called [565] aq süyek "white bone" in contrast to the commoners who are called qara süyek "black bones".

563 565 Most members of the nobility claim to be descendants of Chinghis Khan and a considerable number of the bäks and khans undoubtedly belong to the old steppe aristocracy. However, a wealthy patriarch, with a reputation for being a fair judge, who was chieftain of a numerically rich aul or great aul could become a tribal leader by popular consent.

The white bones regard marriage between white bones and black bones as unsuitable.

[567] In addition to the white bones and the black bones there exists a third stratum, consisting of descendants of slaves who were officially freed during the middle of the last century. They do not own herds, not even single heads of cattle, but function as shepherds, farmhands, servants, etc. However, some cases are known of poor farmhands (after the abolition of slavery in Russia in 1857 which affected the tribes living athwart the Sino-Russian border so that they too decided to abolish the institution of slavery about 1869) gradually acquiring cattle and therefore ascending into the higher stratum.

563 622 The Kirghiz are not ruled by a bäk or a khan, but by elders whose functions, however, are identical with those of the bäks and khans. The elders "manap" are elected by popular acclaim, and they, in turn, fall under the leadership of an aga-manap

/The New Uighurs/

563 121 175 out clearly by the Orkhon inscriptions in which the Khaqan complains bitterly of the Turkic susceptibility to Chinese culture, and the rapid sinification of his people. In this sense, sinification meant that the Turkic tribes gradually gave up their nomadic life and settled in more permanent camp sites. These events had strong repercussions on Turkic social structure, which moved from kinship to function and territory. After the New Uighurs had been expelled from their ancestral lands by the Kirghiz in 840 A.D. they settled around the Tarim Basin. They had to [177] abandon their nomadic way of life and to learn Chinese irrigation practices in order to survive and to maintain a certain level of productivity.

563 175 565 554 Thus the New Uighurs established what may be called an irrigation civilization. Class lines in New Uighur society became more flexible. Whereas noble status was based on descent in the nomadic era, high social prestige and, therefore, high status was now attained by wealth gained through efficient labor and irrigational practices. Nearly all the irrigation canals were dug by collective effort. However, the actual water right of each farmer was in proportion to the quantity of labor he contributed to the digging. Irrigation regulation was entirely a matter of self-government. The Mirab, or keeper [624] of the registry and person in charge of water distribution, and his assistant the Kokbeshi, were chosen by the village. This meant considerable social mobility, though traces of a more rigid class structure remain. For example, the Aqsaqal is the successor to the former tribal chieftain, but unlike the former he is chosen from among the villagers, and his office [771] is not hereditary as was that of the tribal leader. Class lines based on racial distinctions do not exist among the New Uighurs, since the unifying factor in the society is not race but religion. [582] Should a New Uighur marry a Chinese woman, she becomes a member of the community by "baptism."

563 565 The following distinctions may be noted in the New Uighur class system as a whole:

[423] 1. About two-thirds of the New Uighur population belongs to the small peasantry, holding title to one to three acres of irrigated land. On rare occasions a small peasant may till up to thirty acres. Politically, this social stratum has little or no power, unless they participate as a group in a mass movement.

[423] 2. About one-eighth of the New Uighur population belongs to the "landed gentry" holding title to fifty or more acres. All their land usually is rented to tenant farmers, who pay the landlord up to eighty per cent of the land's produce. Politically, this segment of the New Uighur class structure is the strongest, or at least it was, prior to 1949. Usually the communal leaders are elected from this segment of the population.

/The New Uighurs/

563 565 A small percentage of these landlords have invested their wealth exclusively in irrigation projects since water constitutes the most profitable commodity.

563 565 793 [891] 3. The rest of the New Uighur population is subdivided into the following social groupings: a. The clergy (Muezzin, Iman, Mullah, etc.) constitutes a very important segment of the social structure. In its hands the education of the youth rested up to 1949, and it played an important role in shaping the character of the community. As the representatives of the mosque, they are not only the spiritual leaders of the community, but they are also the administrators of the land belonging to the mosque.

563 565 795 [423] This land came into the possession of the mosque as bequests from pious Moslems. Thus, the mosque is not only a spiritual, but also an economic, center. In addition, the mosque serves as a social welfare institution, in that it cares for all those persons of the community who are unable to make a living.

563 565 441 b. The merchants constitute the last segment of the New Uighur class structure. After the Arab conquest of Inner Asia, the merchants enlarged and promoted existing trade centers, thereby acquiring greater wealth and influence. It is noteworthy that most merchants in the Northwest are Moslems. In their hands rest not only most economic activities, but also the dissemination of Turkic and Arab culture. In the merchant ranks, the Chinese found willing and able officials who enjoyed the same privileges as did the Chinese administrators. However, in the Moslem uprisings, these officials aligned themselves with the Moslem population, and often assumed leadership in these movements of rebellion against the Chinese rulers. It may be presumed that to a large extent the Moslem uprisings in the Northwest were incited by the merchants.

563 [591] Among the New Uighurs residence is bilocal. Dwellings are usually occupied by extended families who either form an economic unit, or work as individuals or a family group on the fields or irrigation projects of a wealthy landowner. Polygamy [595] is practiced by the wealthier Moslems, especially the merchants [556] of Sinkiang, who have wives at different trading centers and therefore become the masters of several family units. The [851] children resulting from these marriages are all treated as [428] equals. Inheritance follows the rules of primogeniture. In [562] contrast to the nomadic peoples of Sinkiang, whose women occupy a relatively high and valuable position, the women of the sedentary peoples of the same area, the Turkic women, are held in low esteem. The Sinkiang nomad must buy his bride

/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

making of a will, the giving of alms, rites at the grave, and the recitation of prayers and giving of alms on certain days after death, and on the first, second and third anniversaries.

The Moslems have their own burial grounds. The mounds raised over the graves are rectangular, not round as in the case of the Chinese. The top of the filled grave must be at least five inches (half a Chinese foot) above the surrounding earth, lest the location be forgotten. A stone may be erected in front of the grave, but the name of the deceased may not be engraved upon it.

e. Festivals and holidays

Many of the religious festivals are more pagan than Moslem, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar. Their celebrations are merely popular gatherings for feasting and enjoyment.

The Moslem New Year (Yengi Yil) celebrates the breaking of the Ramadan fast. The festival takes place during the first three days of the tenth month by the Moslem calendar. Special services are held in the mosques. The people bathe and dress in their best clothes. It is a time of greeting, well-wishing, feasting, visiting and gift-giving. For the Moslems and the Chinese alike, the New Year celebration is the greatest holiday of the year.

5. Present day conditions

According to a speech delivered by Burkhan, chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the China Islamic Association, at the Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, on October 18, 1952, the Islam religion as well as the customs and habits of its followers are fully respected by the Communist regime. Chinese Moslems are free to practice their faith without interference. It is also said that official circulars from Peking have ordered the people to continue the observance of their important festivals. The tax on the slaughter of cattle for Moslem consumption is abolished, and official holidays are granted on Moslem holidays.

In accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, the mosques may retain their land holdings if the local populace so desire. It is also reported that when the land reform movement was carried out in the Northwest, the land of the mosques was in most cases left untouched. There was also a report of an organized Hajji to Mecca in 1952, which for reasons unknown failed to reach its goal. Special government regulations give Moslem workers in public organizations and educational institutions time off on the more important religious festival days. In military units, factories and schools, consideration is also given to the habits and customs of cadres, soldiers, workers and students of the Moslem faith.

/Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang/

795 796 798 to religions other and older than Islam. The Moslem priests, powerless to destroy the popular worship of certain shrines, adopted those shrines and named them after Islamic personages.

The Turki is a great believer in the efficacy of local saints, and there are innumerable shrines all over the country dedicated not only to the "imams," but to later saints and heroes. These sanctuaries usually have some beliefs and observances attached to them, connected either with the curing of diseases or with the bearing of children. At shrines of the latter type, the majority of pilgrims are women. The mullas have therefore been obliged, for the sake of propriety, in each case to invent a female saint, complete with legend, to bring the cult in line with Islam. The [798] [769] popular names of the shrines reveal that most of these cults have been derived from the ancient practices of ancestor worship.

771 796 Paganism, as well as ancestor worship, is still prevalent in this land despite a thousand years of Islam. Many of the religious festivals, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar, are more pagan than Moslem. They are merely popular gatherings for the purpose of feasting and enjoyment, and are probably older than Islam.

793 794 The clergy in Sinkiang is divided into two categories: the judges and the priests in one, and the simple clerks in the other (the mullas). The latter class includes all males who can read and write and wear a turban. Above these mullas, there is a class of mosque officials with specific functions: the Muazzin, who calls the believers to attend the daily prayers, the Imam, who leads the services, the Mutakib, in charge of seeing that the laws of the Koran are observed, the Reis, prefect of discipline, the Khatib, who delivers the Friday sermon, and the mulla a'lam, doctor of law who is also in charge of the circumcision ceremony.

793 [423] The resources of the clergy consisted mostly of waqf, land property which had been donated to them or confiscated by them. In spite of the Chinese confiscations of clergy landed property, until recent times this constituted an important source of income for the clergy. Other clergy sources are the Zakat, donations from richer believers, casual fees, judicial fees, and fees paid for marriages, funerals and so forth. The Zakat is not a very substantial source of income, as the Sinkiang Moslems are lax in adhering to this obligation. At present it is almost impossible for the clergy to subsist without resorting to some secular occupation.

793 692 [777] The judicial power and the police functions of the clergy in the past have diminished greatly during the Chinese administration. The Qazis judge cases which are brought voluntarily to

815 668 177 is not quite clear in the minds of the people - they are acquainted with the science of medicine, for which they have great respect, they are bombarded by propaganda telling them of the evil uses of scientific discoveries, mainly the "germ warfare" supposedly launched against China by the United States, and they are encouraged to adopt a "scientific" attitude toward the ideology of Communism, the science of revolution.

829 668 177 [439] Industrialization is, for the most part, a thing of the future as far as Sinkiang is concerned. The Turks do not even have a word for industry. They use now the term caliskanlik, meaning industriousness. Not much has been done in this field, and the products of industry have been brought to Sinkiang from China Proper and Soviet Russia. Since the process of industrialization will so strongly affect a large part of the urban population consisting of independent small artisans, shopkeepers and merchants, it is very likely that these groups will not look with favor at this process.

• 423 668 177 With the strong emphasis that the Turkic people put on ownership of property, particularly landed property, it is only natural that great resistance is encountered from both the small farmers and the big landowners to the process of collectivization. The incentive to work will, in many cases of collectivization, be taken away from the farmers, when they are not allowed to anjoy the products of their labor. Collectivization is forced on the Turkic people, and involves a basic change in their economic outlook and ideas. Collectivization may not affect the tenants as strongly, since they have never tilled their own land, and the loss to them is not as great, economically or psychologically, as it is to those who owned their land, no matter how small their property was.

K. Attitude toward the Present Political Regime

829 668 177 Communist sources describe the reaction of the national minorities to the new regime and its leaders as follows: "Political consciousness is rising; the people's love for Chairman Mao Tse-tung and their homeland is heightened by all that is happening day by day (Ulanfu, Vice-Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs, Report of the General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities), or, "The growth of the movement to resist United States aggression and aid Korea has further added to the education in patriotism among our national minorities whose overwhelming majority deeply love and warmly support Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's Government."

In spite of these statements, it is difficult to conceive how the Turks so "deeply love and warmly support" a Chinese leader who has not brought about the fulfillment of their national aspirations, but those of Chinese nationalism, and who has united them not with the world of Islam but with the Communist block. The glori-

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

S 563 642 643 179 829 The old administration of the Khan was not always liked by the Moslems, but he and his people were one, and they understood each other well. His Oriental style of court life was appreciated by the Turkis, and the Khan, by virtue of his hereditary title, was unquestionably accepted by them. There was immediate resentment among the populace at the suggested changes, and the resentment became the more bitter when a great display of highly organized officialdom was made.

S 563 179 631 642 829 [423] At the same time, the whole area of Hami was carefully surveyed and the land redistributed. Three large administrative districts were arranged and given names which dated back to the Han dynasty. The new government was to be wholly in Chinese hands, and the old Khanate system was to vanish. Chinese magistrates were appointed to hear the law cases and Chinese tax-collectors were to levy the dues and convey them to the capital, where they would be allocated to the respective departments. These propositions all seem legitimate to the Chinese authority and they were presented to the people as improved measures of justice; but the Moslems did not like them and had a great deal of suspicion towardsthem. There was also the rumor that some unappropriated land which the Turki farmers would have liked to use was given to the Chinese and that arrears of taxes from which the Chinese were exempt were demanded from Moslem landowners.

S [669] Suddenly that dangerous thing so well known to the Oriental as a "breath of fury" rose fiercely among men who had hitherto dealt only with their own Khan, and they unanimously determined on revolt.

N 829 565 Fan Ch'ang-chiang, a well-known journalist connected with the most influential Chinese daily Ta Kung Pao in the prewar period and now editor of the People's Daily in Peking, reported, after a trip to the Northwest in 1936 through Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, that the common people, especially the peasants in

N [651] Kansu, all had a very bad impression of the government. Because there were so many kinds of taxes, the people thought that the government had nothing to do but to collect taxes from the common

N 565 181 562 829 people. The people did not trust the government. In regard to social customs Fan says that the Chinese in Kansu are very conservative in matters which have anything to do with their women. Even middle-aged women of respectable families can hardly have anny opportunity to be seen by or to be spoken to by any man who is not a relative or a neighbor. Young ladies must absolutely not be seen by strangers. Soldiers who have come from the coastal provinces and who are accustomed to more liberal relations between the two sexes were resented by the local people because

N 565 829 181 they acted rather freely toward their women folk. Notwithstanding their bad impression of the government and their resentment toward the "outside" soldiers, the common Chinese in Kansu are

000 purge took place.

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*668 In order to control Christians, the Communists sponsored a
798 movement to reorganize the churches. Following the principles of Communism all the churches were supposed to be combined under the leadership of the Communist government. The movement started with a government-sponsored statement entitled, "Road for Chinese Christian Churches in Reconstructing New China." All Christians were asked to sign their names to this statement. To most Christians, this movement was a rebellion against God. To the Communists, any Christian who refused to sign was a potential "counter-revolutionary". According to the Communist report, 1,527 Christians signed the statement in August and 1,741 signed in September of 1950. Among these, 44 were in Shensi and 1 in Kansu. (Peking Jen-min Jih-pao, December 5, 1950). No detailed figures of the later years are on hand but it was the start of a continuous persecution of Christians loyal to their faith.

An editorial of the Jen-min jih-pao of July 7, 1955 complained about sabotage activities of "reactionary" religious groups in Shensi and Kansu during 1954 and recommends: "We must take effective actions and resolutely beat the sinful activities of all the reactionary religious groups.... We must severely suppress these religious leaders. As to the common believers... we must order them to register in the government and force them to sign a pledge to withdraw from their religious organizations."

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668 The Sinkiang jih-pao of June 18, 1953 discussed the activities
• 423 of people's courts in the district of Urumchi: "When the land re-
692 form began, the personnel of the courts cooperated with the land reform teams to penetrate into the villages. They called various meetings and publicized the policy, function and missions of the people's court... They encouraged the mass to accuse the landlords,.... Generally they would arrest the landlords... confiscate their property and publicly liquidate them. When a case could be used to educate the people they would convict the man in public trial before a mass meeting. For instance, after the arrest of the unlawful landlord Je-he-p'u (most likely an Uighur) of T'o-k'e-sun, the team and the court organized a small scale liquidating meeting against him in his village. Then they organized a large scale liquidating meeting in the hsiang with deputies from every district of the county presented.... In less important cases, the landlords were warned before the public... and forced to admit their sin and publicly accuse themselves... The important point is to use the local people as the judge and the jury. ... For instance, when the 3rd hsiang of the 3rd district of Shanshan publicly accused the local despot and landlord P'ai-tsu-nan (probably an Uighur), the judge and the jury were all minority cadres. The mass was very much pleased, saying, "Now... it

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668 is our own people who are judging and sentencing people." But...
423 we must give the minority cadres concrete help and guidance."
692 The Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, 1955, no. 7, reported: "On March 14, 1955, the People's Court of Hsien-yang County in Shensi called a public accusation rally to punish Chao Chu-shih. It reclassified him as a landlord, and confiscated all his land, drafting animals, farming tools and houses, except the part his family deserves to have."

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668 IV. The Pledges and Practices Regarding Economic Rights
423 In view of this lack of personal security very few people dared to defend their property rights. In the Common Program of 1949, Article 3 stated: "The People's Republic of China must abolish all the prerogatives of imperialist countries in China. It must confiscate bureaucratic capital and put it into the possession of the people's state. It must systematically transform the feudal and semi-feudal land ownership system into a system of peasant land ownership; it must protect the public property of the state and of the cooperatives and must protect the economic interests and private property of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. It must develop the people's economy of New Democracy and steadily transform the country from an agricultural into an industrial one." A number of terms in this article are vague; they are presumably to be kept this way to allow for a flexible interpretation.

It is hard to draw a definite line between the "bureaucratic capital" and "economic interests and private property of workers, farmers, the petty bourgeoisie class and the national bourgeoisie." Only after the loss of one's property, he would realize that he was a bureaucratic capitalist or feudal, or semi-feudal landowner. Those who kept their property would have to regard it as a favor rather than a right.

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668 The present Communist Constitution is more explicit. It has
642 quite a number of articles relating to economic system and rights.
421 These are articles four to fourteen. Besides, there are several more articles to protect the citizens, namely 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, etc.

In these articles the constitution clearly states that the economic system in a socialist nation shall be built on state ownership, supplemented by cooperative ownership, (articles 6 and 7), while they are definitely going to eliminate "rich-peasant economy" (article 8) and "capitalist ownership" (article 10). The protection of the rights of ownership and inheritance (article 12), the property of the individual farmers (article 8) and workers (article 9) is subject to the regulations of law which will be adjusted from time to time to encourage the individual owners to organize cooperatives voluntarily. Protection of private income, savings, housing, and

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668 other living materials is limited to those which are "legitimate."
642 Thus landlords cannot legitimately collect rent on land and
421 interest on loans. The legal status of house rent and banks'
C payment of interest on deposit are not yet clarified. The duty of
[651] paying taxes (article 102), the privilege of working hard (article
[461] 91), and the responsibility of offering contributions in labor, money and kind, furnish more means for the Communist government to ensure "the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the building of a socialist society." (article 4)

C Late in 1950, the agrarian reform movement began to spread.
668 The movement did not concern itself only with the redistribution
423 of land, but also included the confiscation and redistribution of
422 draft animals, farm implements, grain supplies, and so forth, which was later to be followed by a program of cooperativization. Some excerpts from the Chinese press will illustrate how the agrarian reform was handled in the Northwest.

S The New China News Agency, November 16, 1950, reported:
[668] "The farmers in Sinkiang, including the various minorities, deeply
[421] felt the warmth of the People's Government and the People's Army
[651] and requested to pay more taxes (in grain).... At the same time, the peasants in various places universally started class struggle against the... criminal landlords."

The same agency, December 7, 1950, reported the start of a
S "Rent Reduction and Down with Local Despots" campaign in the
668 Northwest as a prelude to full scale land reform. From the win-
• 423 ter of 1950 through the spring of 1951, it was reported that 3017
N hsiang (administrative villages) confiscated more than 1,000,000
*668 mou of land (each mou is ca. 1/6 acre), 30,000 heads of draft
423 animals and more than 200,000 pieces of farm implements in Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. By May, 1952, 4364 hsiang in the Northwest had completed 72.6% of the original quota. (NCNA, May 28, 1951). In total, during the winter and spring seasons of 1951 and 1952 more than 20,000,000 mou of land were confiscated in the Northwest. The population who received land and other productive material was from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 people. (Sian Ch'üh-chung Jih-pao, May 5, 1952.)

S Thus Burhan, the Governor of Sinkiang, could report to the
668 Sinkiang Provincial People's Congress on September 20, 1955:
423 "From September, 1952 to the end of 1953, in the agricultural district of Sinkiang we completed the whole program of land reform. We destroyed the landlord class. We abolished feudal land ownership. We confiscated and condemned more than 7,300,000 mou land and other properties to be distributed to 2,100,000 poor farmers with little or no land."

S A report by the Vice Secretary-general of the Communist
[518] party at Aksu, Sinkiang, P'eng I-min, in Sinkiang jih-pao, April 3, 1953, reveals, however, some of the difficulties which the land reform movement encountered in Sinkiang.

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668 reform movement encountered in Sinkiang. The attempts at forced
423 cooperation resulted in many hard feelings and in violations of the
578 principles set forth by the government. Examples were cited of
474 "middle farmers" supplying carts or other tools, but not participating in the actual labor. Village cadres were unwilling to work on the cooperative farms lest their private interests suffer. Considerable difficulties were experienced in finding people who would accept responsibility. A partial solution was sought in sending more professional party workers to aid the cadres.

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*668 Similar reports are available from other parts of the North-
423 west. From these reports the following trends can be gathered:
474 (1) In the program of cooperativization the policy was to exclude not only the landlords but also the rich farmers. Since those who were not in the cooperatives would suffer social and economic os-
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668 tracisim, the threat to all individual farmers kept out of the co-
423 operatives was great.
474 (2) The experience of those who did join the cooperative groups, however, was not happy. Their hard work often was not properly rewarded. It was difficult to keep the record of credits straight. This was the reason why many cooperatives collapsed.
(3) However, the average farmer, including the party cadre, dreamed of becoming a rich farmer and private businessman.

Against this background one can understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's drive for one million cooperatives in 1955. According to Mao's plan, by the spring of 1958 half of the agricultural population must be organized into cooperatives. In other words, by that time, half of the farmers in Northwest China would no longer be working on their own farms.

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*668 In the field of commerce and industry, the 3-anti and 5-anti
472 movements were the prelude to the program which calls for the total elimination of private enterprise.

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668 As described above, the political rights in the Chinese Soviet
472 days followed the conventional Communist Party line. But during
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*668 the Second World War, the Chinese Communists had advocated
666 their democratic government and democratic elections in the border regions. Their procedure of a secret ballot included the following practices: "Each of the candidates' names is written on a bowl. The voter drops a bean or pea in the bowl bearing the name of his choice. If his election "unit" is entitled to more than one representative, he is given the proper number of beans. If a considerable number of the voters cannot read, the candidates are lined up, each carrying a well-calanced bowl or basket on his back. The voter drops his bean or beans into the bowl or bowls of his favorite candidate or candidates. The bowl is carried on the back to insure secrecy, so that no candidate knows who elects whom." (Hsu Yung Ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 59.)

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668 Article 51: Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where
641 national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy
642 organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power.

Article 53: All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs...

In the Constitution of 1954 the articles 3, 53, 54, 60, 67-72, 77, and 86 refer to the minorities. Some statements in these articles are very concrete, such as:

"Article 68: In all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties where a number of nationalities live together, each nationality is entitled to appropriate representation on the organs of self-government.

Article 71: In performing their duties, organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties employ the spoken and written language or languages commonly used in the locality.

Article 77: Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The People's Courts are to provide interpretation for any party unacquainted with the spoken or written language commonly used in the locality.

In an area where people of national minorities live in compact communities or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings in people's courts are conducted in the language commonly used in the locality, and judgments, notices and all other documents of the people's courts are made public in such language."

Others are more vague, such as articles 3, 67, 70 and 72. Contrary to Article 4 of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic of the early 1930's, which stated that the minority groups "may either join the Chinese Soviet state or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer," the Constitution of 1954 denies the right of secession. It says in clear and definite words: "National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China." (Article 3). Before further analysis can be made, some essential data help reveal the Communists' policy in practice toward the minorities in the Northwest.

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563 B. Class Barriers vs. Nationality Barriers
423 1) "Comrade Editor:
423 In November, 1952, when the six 'land-reform experimenting
565 hsiang' in the 5th district of Sui-ting County were 'distributing the
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563 fruit of struggle' there were more landlords and more fruits in the
• 423 1st hsiang than the 6th hsiang where both the landlords and fruits
431 were few. The laboring people of the 1st hsiang passed to the
565 peasants of the 6th hsiang fruits valued to 400 buckets (hu) of wheat
668 and 3,000 mou (about 500 acres) of rice paddies for distribution. The peasants of the 6th hsiang were deeply moved and wept. The 6th hsiang originally was a Kazakh area. When the Russians, Chinese Uighurs, Mongols of the 1st hsiang...drove carts loaded with fruits to the hsiang, the Kazakh fellow-citizens were so happy that they jumped up and down and ran to the side of the carts. They hugged the Russians and kissed them. They stuck out their thumbs before the Chinese (a gesture of approval) and yelled 'A-k'ang' (i.e. elder brother). They danced with the Uighurs and the Mongols.

At the same time, when the 6th hsiang classified the people, they found that there were 2 Chinese landlords, 1 Uighur landlord and 4 Kazakh landlords. People suddenly realized that the ones
[186] who had suppressed the people were these landlords, not the landlords of one particular nationality, and certainly not any nationality as a whole..." (Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 24, 1953).

668 This is an excellent example of the way the Communists carry
565 the class struggle across nationality lines. They substitute class
186 hatred for national hatred.

2) "The second stage of land reform in Shu-le County, Sinkiang,
668 involved 20 hsiang and lasted 78 days from December 12, 1952, to
423 March 3, 1953... In these 20 hsiang (during the land reform) we have developed 859 'positive elements,' an average of more than forty people in each hsiang. This laid the foundation for further works....

"Before the confiscation, we called in the rich farmers, the small land lessors and religious leaders for discussion meetings. In these meetings we explained the policy of preserving 'rich farmer economy' and 'freedom of religious belief.' In execution, we definitely carried out the government's policy toward the mosques. Besides leaving strictly alone the land originally owned by the mosques, through consultation between the mosques and the farmers associations, we left a reasonable amount of land to the mosques which had lost their land through confiscation. In the bazaar, we called meetings of businessmen. There we propagated one step forward the policy of protecting business. Throughout the confiscation we did not touch business owned by the landlords.

"We strengthened the work of the United Front. Through the upper level, the religious leaders and people with high prestige and influence among the local mass, we promoted the propaganda of our policy. Hence we avoided the fear psychology which had spread among the landlords to a certain extent. During the confiscation, we firmly carried out the policy of discrimination. We carried out struggled against landlords who stubbornly resisted,

668 but gave a certain degree of good care to the liberal-minded land-
• 423 lords during the procedure of confiscation. To those obedient landlords we only carried out confiscation but not the struggle. Besides land, other properties were left to them for a while before actual confiscation. Thus we isolated the stubborn landlords, reduced the resistance and increased help. Under the threat of the peasants, the majority of the landlords expressed willingness to be obedient.

"But there were still defects and mistakes...(1) We were not able to build up the poor farmers and hired hands to be the nucleus of the movement as we had planned....(On the contrary), it was the middle farmers who led the poor farmers, and the poor farmers who led the hired hands...(2) Some farmers...gave sympathy to the landlords during the confiscation and dared not accept the land in distribution...(3) During the distribution, there was illustrated a serious domination of the party cadres over the farmers...." (Yang Tseng-wen, "Victoriously concluded the work of the second stage of land reform in Shu-le County" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, 1953, April 3.)

Some basic facts in this statement can be summarized as follows:

(1) Natives were used to fight against the natives.
(2) Native workers were selected and built up through various devices.
(3) Enemy groups were divided and isolated by discriminating treatment.
(4) Only a few of the most stubborn enemies were selected as targets at one time. Thus most of the people were kept hopeful and cooperative.
(5) Religious groups and the local leaders with great influence among the minorities were handled with care.

668 The policy of controlling the minority groups through minority
563 cadres is further shown in the following report: "In the whole special district...of Ili, there originally were 3243 cadres at the hsiang, ch'ü, county and special district level. During 1952...the number increased to 4736. It was a 46.3% increase over that of 1951.... During the past one year,...more than 30,000 common workers and farmers became 'positive elements' who executed the policy and orders of the Communist Party and the People's Government....

"During the past year, 90% of the cadres of the special district received education and drill through the struggles of the suppression of the counter-revolutionists movement, the American Aid-Korea movement, the reduce-rent and anti-despot movement, the land reform movement, the 3-anti and 5-anti movement...and joined the Communist Party and Youth Corps. Some of them became leading workers. According to the incomplete statistics, in the whole special district there were 274 persons promoted from 'positive elements' to become new cadres; 88 persons promoted from cadres to leading

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through her children's eyes, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1953, pp. 49-50.)

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2) In the 2nd district of P'i-shan County in Sinkiang, there were a large portion of the farmers thinking that since the land they received from the Communists before was taken back by the Communists for redistribution in the land reform, there is no guarantee that the land they received this time will not be taken away from them at a later date. Hence, quite a number of them were not anxious to prepare for the spring ploughing. After the propaganda work of the members of the Party and the Youth Corps, these peasants learned that the lands they had received before were only given on a temporary basis. The lands they got through land reform are really theirs now. This propaganda dissolved the peasants' mistaken thoughts and doubts.... For instance, before the doubts were dispelled, peasant T'u-ta-a-hung slept in his room all the day long instead of going out to cultivate the land. Now he is working hard on his land and even refuses to rest at noon time. (Sinkiang jih-pao, April 8, 1953.)

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B. Factors not Contributing to Success

1. Sporadic nature of campaigns

However, these successes do not indicate that the Communist propaganda program has been carried out without exceptions. As early as 1949, some writers who were responsible for manufacturing propaganda found it difficult to praise the new regime. Then when propaganda became a part of the huge Party machine in the newly-conquered mainland, it developed other problems. At first, the movements were sporadic and geared to deadlines. Whenever the Party leader decided to promote a certain program, the rank and file had to work day and night to promote the theme. Once the interest changed, the whole program would be abruptly dropped and a new program would be rushed to fit the new propaganda purpose. This was criticized by the Communists themselves:

"In September, 1953, Mr. Jen....wrote a short article ridiculing several bureaucratic persons who did not consider seriously letters sent in by the people. He mailed it to a newspaper... After one month, the newspaper editor returned his manuscript with the following comment:

'The central propaganda mission concerning the serious handling of people's letters is over now....Therefore we sent your honorable manuscript back to you...'

To the surprise of the editor, on November 4th, Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial: 'Push one step forward in the work of handling letters sent in by the people'. Then all of a sudden the editorial department of that newspaper wrote to comrade Jen,

161 About two-thirds of the total area of Sinkiang is uninhabited.
311 In 1946 the number of farm households was 344,000 and the average number of acres per farm was around 7.1. (Cressey, Land of the
[114] 500 Million, p. 105. This figure, according to other sources, is rather high.. These sources give a figure of from 0.5 to three acres per farm.) The total amount of cultivated land was 2,455,000 acres or roughly one per cent of the total acreage of the region. The greatest concentration of population is south of the Tienshan, or more precisely, in the southwestern corner of the province near the Soviet border. These are the districts of Khotan, Aksu, and Yarkand which contain over two-thirds of the population of the whole province. North of the Tienshan, the greatest concentration is in the Ili valley.

243 According to the figures supplied by Owen Lattimore, the
433 annual wheat crop of Sinkiang before the Communist conquest was about 253,000 tons, about forty-four per cent of the total crop of grain, beans, and seeds. Corn reached 331,000 tons or twenty-eight per cent. Rice was about 71,000 tons or six per cent, and sesame, rapeseed, and linseed accounted for 71,000 tons or six
[244] per cent. Barley, kaoliang, sorghum millet, beets, and peas amounted to 119,000 tons or ten per cent. Millet, soybean, and green beans totalled 71,000 tons or six per cent. Total agricultural output was 916,000 tons. (Pivot of Asia, p. 167.)

243 Winter wheat is grown north of the Tienshan where, in spite of the cold, the seeds are protected by the cover of snow; only spring wheat can be grown south of the Tienshan, where lack of snow cover exposes the seed to being frozen in the ground. Wheat is tending to be displaced by rice in oasis fields because the fields are highly alkaline. But the yield of rice is lower than that of corn, because the Uighur farmers do not transplant the young rice
[461] shoots as Chinese farmers do. Although the amount of labor
[433] expended on a unit of land is about the same in Sinkiang as in China Proper, the yield is somewhat less.

248 Cotton is the most important commercial crop in Sinkiang. It was grown in Turfan as early as the T'ang Dynasty (618 - 907). Two varieties are raised: the native and the American. In 1943, 100,000 acres of cotton were planted, seventy-three per cent with native cotton and twenty-three per cent with seed
288 of the American varieties. Silk is also an ancient crop of com-
433 mercial importance. Its production reached 350,000 kg. in 1942 but fell drastically to 100,000 kg. in 1943.

592 The family group, living together under one roof, is the basic
241 producing unit in oasis agriculture. It often includes married children, which makes it slightly larger than the average farm family in China. While farms in the Tarim Basin average from
[423] 4.5 to six acres in size, larger than the 3.5 acres given for China Proper, because the family in Sinkiang is larger, there is only

S 592 241 423 0.58 acres per capita as against 0.68 in China Proper. It is difficult to obtain a picture of the land tenure system because of the lack of data. But according to a field survey referred to by Owen Lattimore covering sixty-five households in two villages in the Khotan oasis, the smallest farm was 1.08 acres and the largest farm was eight acres. A further breakdown revealed that S (184) rich peasants in this group had average holdings of eleven acres, middle peasant 5.7, and the poor peasants 2.8 acres. In the area where this survey was conducted, it seems that the farms of the poor were too small for the efficient use of draft animals and there was the problem of efficiently employing, on a tiny farm, the labor potential of the large Uighur family. (Pivot of Asia, p. 169.)

S 311 313 4. Forestry

There is forest land in the rich Ili valley but it is questionable whether much timber can be exploited without serious damage to the soil. Since much of Sinkiang is desert and wasteland there are few forest reserves; out of the total Sinkiang area only about five per cent is forest land.

C. Kansu, Shensi, Ninghsia, and Chinghai

N 133 134 (243) 1. The setting

J. L. Buck refers to this part of the Northwest as the spring wheat and winter wheat-millet area. In the spring wheat area (northern Kansu, Ninghsia, and Shensi) high hills, small mountains, and narrow irrigated valleys characterize the best agricultural land. But along the great wall in Shensi, Ninghsia and Kansu are many undulating sand dunes extending from ten to seventy miles both northward and southward. When the Mongols occupied this region, these dunes were covered with grass and shrubs, but where the Chinese settled here, they cultivated the slightly more fertile land in the depressions between the dunes; once the grass was destroyed the winds blew the sand so as to make farming impossible and other nearby good soil was covered with the blowing sand. Grass in such land can seldom be resodded, and it is thus that land once useful, at least for pasture, is now entirely destroyed.

N 133 134 243 The winter wheat-millet area (southern Kansu, Ninghsia, and Shensi) extends over a great part of a loess-covered plateau, a high, dissected peneplain, carved largely from red or purple sholes and conglomerates, covered with deposits, largely lacustrine, and blanketed by wind-blown dust, known as loess, which varies in thickness from about twenty to more than 150 meters. The fields in this region are very irregular and small, and most of the surface is so eroded that cultivation is difficult and much terracing is necessary.

N 132 The climate is cold, dry, and windy in winter. The typical precipitation is low, about fourteen inches, and exceedingly